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Reducing Manipulability
François Durand, Fabien Mathieu and Ludovic Noirie
CRITERIA FOR VOTING SYSTEMS
Set of voting systemsVeto. . .
Informed majority coalition criterion (InfMC)
Amajority may choose the outcome when they know the other votes.
Borda. . .
Ignorant majority coalition criterion (IgnMC)
A majority may choose the outcome.
Range voting, Approval, Coombs. . .
Majority favorite criterion (MF)
Elects a candidate when she is preferred by a majority.
Plurality, Two-round, IRV, Bucklin. . .
Condorcet criterion (Cond)
Elects the Condorcet winner when there is one.
Baldwin, Dodgson, Kemeny, Maximin,
Nanson, Schulze, Tideman. . .
GOAL: MINIMIZE THE MANIPULABILITY RATE
ρ(f) = P(voting system f is manipulable)
CONDORCIFICATION
A new voting system based on f .
Elects the Condorcet winner when there
is one.
Otherwise, same outcome as f .
CONDORCIFICATION THM.
If f meets InfMC:
ρ(f c) ≤ ρ(f).
SLICE
Yet another voting system based on f .
Depends only on orders of preference.
Meets the Condorcet criterion.
SLICING THEOREM
If voters are independent:
ρ(f cs) ≤ ρ(f c).
TRANSFORMATIONS
f
f c
f cs
Initial v ting system f
Condorcification of f
Elects Condorcet winner when she exists.
Otherwise, same outcome as f .
Best slice of f c
Depends only on orders of preference.
Meets the Condorcet criterion.
CONSEQUENCES
To minimize manipulability while keeping InfMC, one may restrict to
voting systems that:
Depend only on orders of preference,
And meet the Condorcet criterion.
